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Deposits are at the core of banks’ ﬁ  nancial intermediation 
function. By issuing deposits, banks reconcile the wishes of 
small savers for high liquidity and low risk with the needs 
of investors, who require stable funding for risky, large, 
and long term projects. By transforming liquid deposits 
into long term assets, banks expose themselves to interest 
rate, credit, and liquidity risks, for which they are remu-
nerated by a typically positive interest rate margin.
There exists a wide range of deposit accounts. Sight 
deposits can be withdrawn at any time and may be used 
as means of payments, but barely offer positive nominal 
returns. Term deposits offer substantially higher market-
consistent returns, but cannot be withdrawn until their 
deﬁ  ned contractual term expires. Savings deposits are spe-
cial, in the sense that they preserve a high degree of liquid-
ity, while offering a relatively attractive rate of return. (1)
In Belgium, savings deposits are also special because they 
are the subject of important regulation affecting their 
pricing, remuneration structure, and ﬁ  scal  treatment.  (2) 
The favourable ﬁ  scal treatment aims to promote savings, 
whereas the price and remuneration structure regulation 
aims more at promoting economic objectives, such as the 
stimulation of ﬁ  xed interest loan contracts by decreasing 
the variability of banks’ volume and cost of funds.
Yet, savings deposit accounts raise important ﬁ  nancial sta-
bility issues. Not only do they represent a signiﬁ  cant pro-
portion of banks’ liabilities, but the large volume of funds 
is used as a major maturity transformation instrument, 
since aggregate savings deposit volumes tend to be fairly 
stable. However, depositors possess the right or option 
to withdraw all or a part of their deposited funds at any 
time. The existence of this “embedded” option, together 
with the bank’s option to change the savings deposit rate 
in response to market rate changes, complicates banks’ 
risk management and supervisors’ prudential assessment. 
Nonmaturity accounts are complex ﬁ  nancial instruments 
to price, value, and manage.
The difﬁ  culty of measuring the interest rate risk of sav-
ings deposits is mainly due to the presence of the two 
embedded options mentioned above, which are clearly 
not independent of each other. For example, if banks 
were to raise deposit rates only partially in response to an 
increase in market rates, depositors might withdraw their 
balances, or part of them, in order to invest their funds 
at the higher market rates. However, if banks fully adjust 
savings deposit rates to increases in market rates, the 
bank incurs a substantial cost as the increased deposit rate 
applies to all existing deposit balances, including the por-
tion that would not have been withdrawn in the absence 
of a full adjustment. Such considerations and interactions 
show that repricing and volume risks should be studied 
jointly within an interest rate risk framework.
(1)  In general, deposit accounts with uncertain effective maturity, i.e. sight and 
savings deposits, are often referred to as nonmaturity deposit accounts. 
Nonmaturity refers to the fact that the behavioural or effective maturity is 
perceived to be quite different from the contractual maturity, which is zero or 
close to zero. The return wedge between nonmaturity and deﬁ  ned maturity 
deposit accounts can be interpreted as an extra illiquidity risk premium that term 
depositors implicitly require. Alternatively, nonmaturity depositors can be thought 
to pay an insurance premium against illiquidity by accepting a lower return.
(2)  The price and remuneration structure regulation is ﬁ  rst speciﬁ  ed in the 
Royal Decree of December 29 1983 and updated in the Royal Decree of 
August 27 1993 (KB/WIB 1992), while ﬁ  scal regulation of savings deposits already 
goes back to 1962. See Box 3 in the Overview of this FSR for further details. 
Belgium is not unique in regulating savings deposits. France, for example, also 
has a similar regulation in place for its saving passbooks, while Finland also had 
tax exempt deposits until mid 2000.138
We analyse the interaction of bank and depositor behav-
iour from a conceptual point of view and discuss the dif-
ferent modelling approaches that can be used to model 
and measure it. While we focus on the special case of 
savings deposit accounts in this article, our analysis has 
a wider relevance, as similar modelling techniques can 
be applied to other ﬁ  nancial instruments with effective 
maturities that differ from contractual ones, such as sight 
deposits or mortgage loans with embedded prepayment 
options.
The article is structured as follows. Section 1 analyses 
the stylized facts of Belgian regulated savings deposits, 
i.e. importance in the Belgian economy, recent evolution, 
and description of deposit volume and rate dynamics. 
Section 2 then focuses attention on the different 
approaches to measure savings deposits’ interest rate 
risk. Finally, Section 3 concludes.
1.   Importance and dynamics of Belgian 
regulated savings deposits
1.1 Importance
Savings deposits play an important role in the funding of 
Belgian banks. The left-hand side panel of Chart 1 shows 
that they increased from 60 billions of euro in December 
1994 to 150 billions in December 2004, i.e. somewhat 
more than 50 p.c. of Belgian 2004 GDP. Savings deposits 
also gained importance in relative terms. The share of reg-
ulated savings deposits in bank liabilities increased from 
10.3 p.c. to 15.5 p.c. in the last decade, while, expressed 
as a percentage of funds collected from customers (i.e. 
bank bonds and total deposits), their share increased from 
23.5 p.c. to 34.4 p.c.
The above aggregate ratios conceal the fact that there is 
actually a substantial amount of variation across banks, 
according to their specialization and size. For example, 
whereas savings deposits account for 11 p.c. of liabilities 
on average for the 4 largest Belgian banks in 2004, this 
average proportion reaches 43 p.c. for the medium-size 
























































































CHART 1  IMPORTANCE OF REGULATED SAVINGS DEPOSITS FOR BELGIAN BANKS AND HOUSEHOLDS
Source : CBFA, NBB.
SHARE IN BANK LIABILITIES
(unconsolidated figures)
SHARE IN HOUSEHOLD FINANCIAL ASSETS
(percentage of total financial assets)
Saving deposits (billions of euro) ( left-hand scale)
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The right-hand side panel of Chart 1 shows that savings 
deposits also account for a signiﬁ  cant and increasing pro-
portion of Belgian household assets : their share increased 
from 9.9 p.c. in December 1993 to 18.8 p.c. in September 
2004. As a result, savings deposits have recently out-
stripped the combined total of bank bonds and all other 
deposits held by households.
The importance of savings deposits in the interest rate 
risk management of Belgian banks is illustrated in Chart 2. 
The chart groups Belgian banks’ assets, liabilities and net 
off-balance-sheet (OBS) positions according to their 
remaining time to repricing, from up to 8 days to more 
than 10 years. The difference between the long and the 
short positions across the repricing buckets is synthesised 
in the line indicating the overall net position. This latter 
is positive at the long end of the maturity spectrum and 
negative at the short end, which conﬁ  rms  the  typical 
maturity transformation function of Belgian banks.
Besides the nine repricing buckets with speciﬁ  c time to 
repricing intervals, there exists a considerable amount of 
assets and liabilities with indeterminate time to repric-
ing. For example, savings deposits are classiﬁ   ed in this 
category and represent about 50 p.c. of all liabilities with 
indeterminate time to repricing.  (1) However, to the extent 
that savings deposits effectively have a high degree of 
stability and relatively sticky interest rates, they should be 
allocated to longer maturity buckets for risk management 
purposes, thereby helping to dampen the overall interest 
rate risk.
1.2  Deposit rate dynamics
Chart 3 represents a quarter century of monthly Belgian 
market and savings deposit rates. More speciﬁ  cally, the 
savings deposit rate -proxied here by the base rate plus 
the loyalty premium offered by a major player in the 
market, hence representative of the rates applied by the 
large Belgian banks- is plotted against the 3m Treasury 
Certiﬁ  cate rate and the 10 year government bond rate. 
Focussing on the market rates, we observe a positively 
sloped yield curve in most of the past 25 years, with some 
exceptions in the early 1980s and 1990s. Comparing 
market with deposit rates, we see that savings deposit 
rates on average lie substantially below market rates. 
The spreads between long rates and savings deposit rates 
have been relatively stable, decreasing only slightly over 
time. Spreads between short market rates and savings 
deposit rates are much less stable and have dropped sig-
niﬁ  cantly in the last decade.
The decreased spreads between market and deposit 
rates may reﬂ  ect a combination of structural changes in 
the market. Among these factors we could mention (i) 
the smaller cross-subsidisation by savings deposits of 
other banking products, (ii) lower servicing costs of sav-
ings deposits thanks to advances in technology, and (iii) 
changes in the competitive conditions. The latter refer 
to increased competition between savings deposits and 
other banking products, as well as increased competition 
between different banks within the market for savings 
deposits. Indeed, interest margin competition seems 
to have increased over time.  (2) While the share of total 
liabilities of the four largest banks in the sector increased 
strongly during the last decade due to a wave of merg-
ers and acquisitions, an inverse trend can be observed 
for the savings deposits in the same time span, where 
the share of the four largest banks actually decreased 
(1)  Own funds and ﬁ  xed assets such as own buildings are also classiﬁ  ed in the 
indeterminate time to repricing bucket, whereas mortgage loans are classiﬁ  ed 
according to their contractual time to repricing, despite the presence of an early 
repayment option.
(2)  Ausubel (1990) and Neumark and Sharpe (1992) show that the market structure 
indeed affects the deposit rate setting behaviour of banks. For example, both 
the equilibrium level and the speed of adjustment of deposit rates are found to 
depend on market concentration. It turns out that deposit rates are on average 



























CHART 2  ASSETS AND LIABILITIES OF THE BELGIAN 
BANKING SECTOR ACCORDING TO RESIDUAL 
TIME TO REPRICING
  (September 2004, unconsolidated figures, billion of euro)




















































































































(1)  The Herﬁ  ndahl-Hirschman statistic is deﬁ  ned as the sum of squared market shares 
(in percentage points) of individual banks. The statistic decreases both as the 
number of banks in the market increases and as the disparity in size between the 
banks decreases. It approaches zero when the banking sector consists of a very 
large number of banks of relatively equal size.
(2)  The Royal Decree of August 27 1993 (KB/WIB 1992) speciﬁ  es that the 
remuneration of savings deposits must consist exclusively of a base rate and a 
growth or loyalty premium. See also Box 3 in the Overview of this FSR for further 
details about the remuneration structure. Since April 1990, the legal ceiling has 
remained unchanged at 6 p.c., i.e. a base rate ceiling of 4 p.c. and a premium 
ceiling of 2 p.c. Between December 1983 and April 1990, the ceiling has been 
changed on various occasions.
(3)  Savings deposit balances data show clear end-of-calendar-year effects, due to 
the pay-out of interest to the deposit holder at the end of each calendar year. 
Therefore, deseasonalised balances are analysed.
(4)  Note that the Royal Decree of August 27 1993 (KB/WIB 1992) stipulates that 
banks must be able to require a 5 days’ notice for withdrawals exceeding 
1,250 euro and to impose a limit on withdrawals of 2,500 euro in any two-week 









































































CHART 3  BELGIAN MARKET AND SAVING DEPOSIT RATES
  (Percentages)
Source : NBB.
3 month Treasury Certificate
Savings deposit rate
(base rate plus loyalty premium)
10 year Government bond rate
from 75 to 69 p.c.. A further Herﬁ  ndahl-Hirschman index 
(HHI) analysis  (1) signals that the competitive pressure is 
coming from a couple of medium-sized players, since the 
HHI for savings deposits still increased between December 
1994 and December 2004 (from 1,130 to 1,800). 
However, the growth in the HHI for total liabilities was 
much stronger (from 760 to 2,580), so that the ratio of 
the former to the latter gradually dropped from 140 p.c. 
in 1994, to only 85 p.c. in 2004.
Despite these spread-tightening factors, Chart 3 indicates 
that savings deposit rates have been and still are rather 
sticky compared to market rates. When banks change the 
savings deposit rate, they seem to do so in a partial and 
sluggish way, i.e. in the same direction as lagged market 
rates and typically in multiples of 1/8th percentage points. 
The savings deposit rate level is capped by law, but bin-
ding deposit rate ceilings do not appear to have been 
the dominant factor in explaining deposit rate stability.  (2) 
Indeed, deposit rates were also stable in the period prior 
to 1983, when there was no legal cap, and in recent 
years, when the cap was no longer binding. An obvious 
explanation for the upside deposit rate stickiness is that a 
repricing of savings deposits is not limited to newly issued 
deposits, as is the case with term deposits, but involves 
all outstanding balances. Hence, increasing the savings 
deposit rate is relatively costly for a bank with a large 
volume of savings deposits.
Box 1 presents further econometric evidence of partial, 
and asymmetric, adjustments of Belgian savings deposit 
rates.
1.3  Deposit balance dynamics
Deseasonalised savings deposit balances have grown 
fairly steadily over time.  (3) During the last quarter cen-
tury, they increased by 4.1 p.c. annually on average in 
real terms (7.1  p.c. in nominal terms). These averages 
conceal the fact that growth has been relatively strong in 
the last 5 years (6.2 p.c. real, 8.2 p.c. nominal), and was 
more moderate in the 80s and 90s (3.5 p.c. real, 6.9 p.c. 
  nominal).
Chart 4 shows year-on-year growth rates of deseason-
alised savings deposits. Despite the typically positive 
growth rates, aggregate deposit balances have some-
times decreased in the past, as illustrated by the negative 
growth rates in the periods 1990-1994 and 2000-2002. 
Deposit balances dropped by about 12 billions of euro 
(peak to trough in 1990-1994), i.e. approximately 20 p.c. 
of February 1990 balances, and by about 8 billions of euro 
(peak to trough in 2000-2002), i.e. approximately 8 p.c. 
of January 2000 balances.
Either general market conditions or idiosyncratic events 
may cause depositors to withdraw all or part of their 
balances.  (4) Given that idiosyncratic events (e.g. death, 
divorce, relocation, house-ownership, etc.) are to a large 
extent diversiﬁ  able across depositors, aggregate deposit 
balance dynamics are driven by general market condi-
tions.
More speciﬁ  cally, as is clearly illustrated in Chart 4, savings 
deposit balance growth rates are affected by depositors’ 
opportunity cost, i.e. the maximum return that the depos-
ited funds could earn if the funds were not deposited in 
a savings account. We approximate the opportunity cost 
as the difference between the 3m Treasury Certiﬁ  cate 
rate, net of withholding taxes, and the deposit rate. 141
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Box 1  –    Belgian savings deposit rate dynamics
Deposit rate dynamics may be further analysed following O’Brien (2000), who has estimated a partial adjustment 
model for U.S. retail deposit rates. In the model, deposit rate changes depend on whether deposit rates are above 
or below a possibly time-varying long-run equilibrium or target deposit rate, which in turn is assumed to be a 
function of market rates. The model allows for an asymmetry in the reaction speed at which the deposit rate is 
expected to mean-revert to its long-run equilibrium level, since the upward change parameter may differ from the 
downward change parameter. O’Brien ﬁ  nds that deposit rates are particularly sluggishly when deposit rates are 
below their long-run equilibrium level, but adjust more swiftly when they are above this level. This asymmetry is 
considered to be a stylized fact of deposit rate dynamics in many countries. We estimate a similar non-linear partial 
adjustment model for Belgian implicit deposit rate changes  (1) :
It=1    if     brt–g–Rt–1>0
It=0 otherwise
∆Rt=(λ+It+λ–(1–It))(brt–g–Rt–1)+et
where λ+, λ–, b, and g are the parameters to be estimated. The variable Rt stands for the deposit rate and 
brt–g is deﬁ  ned as the unobserved time-varying equilibrium deposit rate, itself a function of the market rate rt 
(3m Euribor in our application). O’Brien argues that the long-run equilibrium deposit rate should be at a break 
even level. Hence, b can be considered to be a proxy for 1 minus the marginal reserve requirement if such a 
requirement applies, and g reﬂ  ects the servicing cost and hence should be positive. It is an indicator variable that 
signals whether actual deposit rates are above or below the long run equilibrium deposit rate level. The estimates 
of the parameters λ+ and λ– will then teach us whether deposit rates adjust at different speeds when they are 
above or below the equilibrium level, respectively.
TABLE 1 ESTIMATES FOR THE PARTIAL ADJUSTMENT 
MODEL FOR BELGIAN IMPLICIT DEPOSIT RATES
(Data from June 1996 to September 2004)
Parameter Range of parameter estimates 
for the four largest Belgian banks
λ+ 0.000 to 0.002
λ– 0.072 to 0.267
b 0.826 to 0.990
g 0.000 to 0.005
Table 1 presents the range of constrained nonlinear regression coefﬁ  cient estimates that we obtain for the four 
largest Belgian banks, using a sample of 1996:06-2004:09 implicit deposit rates and the 3m Euribor rate for 
the market rate. The estimates are qualitatively similar to O’Brien’s (2000), since we also ﬁ  nd asymmetry in the 
adjustment of deposit rates towards the long run equilibrium level : λ+ is estimated to be substantially smaller than λ–, 
which implies that deposit rates react rather sluggish towards a higher long run equilibrium deposit rate, but 
respond more swiftly to a lower long run equilibrium deposit rate  (2).
(1)  Implicit deposit rates are deﬁ  ned as the ratio of the interest that is paid out by the bank over a certain period divided by the average outstanding balances over the 
same period. Compared to advertised rates, deﬁ  ned as the sum of base and premium rates, implicit deposit rates may better reﬂ  ect the true cost to the bank, given 
the sometimes intricate day count rules that apply to the premium rates. Moreover, implicit rates make it easier to integrate pre- and post-merger deposit rate data.
(2)  We have formally tested the asymmetry in deposit rate dynamics by computing a test statistic based on the sum of squared errors for both the unrestricted 
asymmetric and restricted symmetric model. The asymmetry is found to be statistically signiﬁ  cant for most banks at conventional conﬁ  dence levels.142
raised again in 1994 to 15 p.c., deposit balances returned 
to positive growth rates.
However, withholding tax regime changes are unable to 
explain the drop in aggregate balances in 2000-2002, since 
the withholding tax regime has remained unchanged since 
1994. The second component of the opportunity cost, the 
increased spread between market and deposit rates, may 
have played a role here. Table 1 reports estimates from 
regressing the deseasonalised monthly changes in log 
deposit balances on a constant and the spread between 
3m Treasury Certiﬁ  cates and the deposit rate. In line with 
what we expect, we ﬁ   nd an inverse relation between 
the spread and savings deposit balances growth rates. 
More speciﬁ  cally, for each percentage point increase in 
the spread, the monthly deposit balance growth rate is 
Deﬁ  ned as such, the opportunity cost is affected by two 
components : (i) the interest rate spread between the 3m 
Treasury Certiﬁ   cate rate and deposit rates and (ii) the 
withholding tax level. We expect a priori that an increased 
opportunity cost, i.e. a higher spread or a lower withhold-
ing tax level, leads to lower or negative deposit balance 
growth rates, and vice versa.
Both components appear to be important in understand-
ing depositors’ withdrawal behaviour. Indeed, the level of 
the withholding tax rate provides a partial explanation 
for deposit balance dynamics, as a substantial amount of 
earned interest on regulated savings deposits is exempt 
from this tax. The drop in aggregate deposit balances in 
1990 coincides with the drop in the withholding tax from 
25 p.c. to 10 p.c. in 1990. When the withholding tax was 
The June 1996 to September 2004 partial adjustment dynamics for a representative Belgian bank are plotted in 
Chart 1, results being qualitatively similar for other banks. It can be seen that the model ﬁ  ts actual deposit rate 
levels and changes well. Actual deposit rates seem to decrease most when actual rates are above their long-run 




































CHART 1  MARKET AND DEPOSIT RATE DYNAMICS FOR A 
REPRESENTATIVE BELGIAN BANK IN A PARTIAL 
ADJUSTMENT MODEL
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expected to be 0.116 p.c. lower, which corresponds to a 
1.4 p.c. lower annual growth rate.
The sensitivity of annual growth rates is estimated to be 
only 1.1 p.c. when we focus on the pre-1994 subsample 
and as high as 6.6 p.c. in the post-1994 subsample, which 
may signal increased mobility and sophistication of small 
investors in the last decade.  (1) The post-1994 increased 
sensitivity of deposit balance growth rates to changes in 
spreads between market and deposit rates can also be 
observed in Chart 4.
Notwithstanding this evidence on sensitivity of savings 
balances to rates, it is clear that depositors on aggre-
gate do not withdraw their entire balances when rates 
on alternative investments are higher, i.e. it is not only 
deposit rates but also deposit balances that tend to 
behave in a sluggish way. This is also found to be the case 
in other countries. The term “core deposits” is sometimes 
used to reﬂ  ect the fact that a substantial part of savings 
deposit balances is held by retail depositors who are not 
highly rate sensitive and are not expected to withdraw 
their balances over a short period of time. Key factors that 
may explain such behaviour are switching costs, mainly in 
relation to the services provided to the customer or the 
information cost incurred by looking for alternatives.
2.   Measuring the interest rate risk of 
savings deposits
As illustrated in Section 1, deposit rate and balance 
dynamics of savings accounts are clearly intertwined. In 
practice and to limit the repricing impact of deposit rate 
changes, banks only sluggishly adjust savings deposit 
rates. However, if savings deposits are not fully and 
immediately repriced with market rates, this may entail 
an outﬂ  ow of deposits, which banks will have to replace 
at a higher cost. In the end, the volume and repricing 
effects have to be taken into account simultaneously in 
the interest rate risk management of banks.
To measure the interest rate risk of savings deposits, two 
approaches can be adopted. The ﬁ   rst one centres on 
banks’ proﬁ  tability and net interest income at risk. If the 
sensitivity of deposit rates and balances to market inter-
est rate increases is underestimated, bank proﬁ  tability will 
decline unexpectedly, as deposit rates are repriced more 
quickly and deposit balances are withdrawn more quickly 
than anticipated. If the sensitivity to market rate increases 
is overestimated, the bank may as a result invest in rela-
tively short-term assets to hedge the interest rate risk and 
thus forego more proﬁ  table long-term investments.
Alternatively, the assessment can be based on the impact 
on banks’ solvency or market value of equity at risk. In 
case of a move in market interest rates, it is important to 
measure the market value sensitivity of savings deposits, 








































































CHART 4  MAJOR DETERMINANTS OF MONTHLY  
YEAR-ON-YEAR CHANGES IN AGGREGATE 
SAVINGS DEPOSITS
  (Unconsolidated figures, percentages)
Source : NBB.
Withholding tax rate
Spread between 3m Treasury Certificate 
and deposit rate (right-hand scale)
Deseasonalised savings deposits 
growth rate (year on year) (left-hand 
scale)
TABLE 1 SENSITIVITY OF DEPOSIT BALANCE GROWTH 
RATES TO CHANGES IN INTEREST SPREADS
(Sample period: January 1981 to December 2003)
Table entries are ordinary least squares coefficient estimates. Corresponding 
t-statistics, corrected for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation, are not reported, but 
imply statistical significance at conventional confidence levels. The spread is the 
difference between the 3m Treasury Certificate and the deposit rate (base rate plus 
loyalty premium). Monthly changes in deseasonalised log balances are used as 
dependent variable.
Source: NBB.
Full sample Pre 1994 Post 1994
Constant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.934 0.837 1.271
Spread (monthly p.c.)  . . . . . –0.116 –0.092 –0.535
p.m. Spread (annual p.c.) .  . –1.4 –1.1 –6.6
(1)  A formal Chow breakpoint test statistic conﬁ  rms the statistical signiﬁ  cance of 
the difference in sensitivity between the two subsamples. The p-value of the test 
statistic is 1.2 p.c.144
the value change in the other direction on the asset side, 
thereby acting as a hedge for the market value of equity.  (1) 
In this article, we focus upon the latter solvency approach 
and analyse the duration, i.e. market value sensitivity to 
interest rate changes, of savings deposits.
Section 2.1 illustrates the impact that different savings 
deposits duration hypotheses can have on the assessment 
of the interest rate risk of Belgian banks. Section 2.2 dis-
cusses the various models that are available to estimate 
the duration of savings deposits. Finally, Section  2.3 
critically discusses these models from a statistical and 
especially prudential point of view.
2.1   Duration of nonmaturity accounts : should we 
care ?
The contractual duration of savings deposits is close to 
zero. However, in normal times, the behavioural or effec-
tive duration of savings deposits is much larger and will 
depend on the sensitivity of deposit rates and balances 
to market rates. Extreme sensitivity to changes in market 
rates gives rise to a zero duration, whereas extreme insen-
sitivity or sluggishness of deposit rates and balances gives 
rise to a much longer duration, close to the duration of 
a consol.
In fact, the effective durations differ widely across time 
and banks, possibly reﬂ  ecting bank-speciﬁ  c deposit rate 
setting behaviour, client-speciﬁ   c withdrawal behaviour, 
the general interest rate environment, and differences 
in the modelling approaches used by banks to estimate 
duration.
The importance of variation in duration estimates is 
reﬂ  ected in Table 2, which illustrates the impact of unex-
pected yield curve shocks on the market value of equity of 
the Belgian banking sector for different savings deposits 
duration assumptions, all else remaining equal.  (2) The table 
reports the results of interest rate stress tests for the overall 
Belgian banking sector for six different durations of savings 
deposits (from 0 to 5 years). The shock tested is a 2 p.c. 
upward shift of the entire yield curve. The data used for 
this test are (i) the various net exposures per time to repric-
ing bucket as illustrated in Chart 2 and (ii) risk weights per 
time to repricing bucket that proxy for the impact of the 
simulated yield curve shock on the market value of equity 
in the different time buckets.  (3) The risk weights are then 
multiplied by the net exposures and the sum of these prod-
ucts gives an estimate of the change in the market value of 
equity following speciﬁ  c yield curve shocks.
The stress tests also require to introduce hypotheses con-
cerning the duration of sight deposits. As they can be 
withdrawn at any time, sight deposits are incorporated, 
in the supervisory reporting scheme, in the repricing 
bucket ‘up to 8 days’. However, these deposits are mostly 
held for transaction purposes instead of investment pur-
poses which makes them quite insensitive to interest rate 
changes. To take this speciﬁ  city into account, an ad-hoc 
treatment has been introduced through two hypotheses. 
In a ﬁ  rst scenario, 50 p.c. of sight deposits are kept in the 
‘up to 8 days bucket’ while the other 50 p.c. are shifted 
to offset the longest positive net exposures. In the second 
scenario, 100 p.c. of sight deposits are used to offset the 
exposures with the longest duration.
(1) We  deﬁ  ne equity as net assets, i.e. what remains after deducting liabilities from 
assets.
(2)  Banks typically measure the duration of savings deposits in their internal models 
by allocating savings deposits to various categories, such as core, volatile and 
remaining deposits, where each of these categories receives a speciﬁ  c duration. 
The exercise here in fact assumes that the weighted average total duration across 
these categories is equal to 0 to 5 years.
(3)  The risk weights are computed as proposed by the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, i.e. as the approximate modiﬁ  ed duration times the assumed interest 
rate shock (see BIS (2004)). The approximate modiﬁ  ed duration calculation 
is based upon the midpoints of each time bucket, e.g. a time to maturity of 
3.5 years is used to proxy for the modiﬁ  ed duration of exposures in the 2 to 5 
year time to repricing bucket.
(4)  It is important to realise that these losses of market value of equity will not be 
immediately and fully reﬂ  ected in banks’ proﬁ  t and loss through a lower net 
interest income. The change in market value of equity, i.e. the discounted sum 
of future net interest income, simply measures the difference in price when 
liquidating the bank’s assets and liabilities before and after the yield curve shock 
(liquidation viewpoint and not going concern viewpoint).
TABLE 2 IMPACT OF A 2 P.C. UPWARD PARALLEL YIELD CURVE SHOCK ON THE BELGIAN BANKING SECTOR’S MARKET VALUE 
OF EQUITY (1)
(Expressed in percentage of regulatory own funds, unconsolidated December 2004 figures)
Source: NBB.
(1) Calculated under the hypothesis of an initial flat 4 p.c. interest rate with all currencies converted to euro.
Hypotheses for sight deposits Duration of savings deposits in years
0 1 2 3 4 5
50 p.c. offset of longest positive exposures  . . . . –14.0 –8.5 –3.3 1.8 6.6 11.2
100 p.c. offset of longest positive exposures  . . . –7.0 –1.5 3.7 8.7 13.6 18.2145
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As can be expected for a banking sector largely engaged 
in maturity transformation activities, the market value 
of Belgian banks’ equity would be signiﬁ  cantly affected 
by large unexpected upward yield curve shifts  (4). More 
importantly, Table 2 indicates that, for any given yield 
curve shock, the speciﬁ   c duration estimate of savings 
deposits has a large impact on the ultimate change in 
market value of equity. There is a clear monotonic relation 
between the impact of parallel yield curve shocks and the 
duration, with smaller duration resulting in a larger nega-
tive impact.
Under the hypothesis that only 50 p.c. of sight deposits 
are shifted to the long end of the repricing spectrum, a 
2 p.c. parallel shock is projected to reduce the banking 
sector’s market value of equity by an amount equal to 
14 p.c. of regulatory own funds when the average savings 
deposits duration is assumed to be 0. This negative impact 
is reduced to 8.5 p.c. when the duration is assumed to be 
1 year. If all sight deposits are allocated to the repricing 
bucket with the longest duration, those losses are reduced 
respectively to 7 and 1.5 p.c. of regulatory own funds.
It is also interesting to observe that the banking sector 
becomes liability sensitive when savings deposits are 
assumed to have relatively long durations. In this case 
the market value of equity would start to increase after a 
parallel increase in interest rates in this case  (1).
Internal model estimates of duration differ substantially 
across individual banks. In the next section, we will discuss 
the most common models that are being used by banks to 
estimate the duration of their nonmaturity accounts.
2.2   Modelling and estimating the duration of 
nonmaturity accounts
To estimate the duration of their nonmaturity accounts, 
most large Belgian banks rely on a particular variant of 
the static replicating portfolio model described below. 
However, some Belgian banks actually use or have 
been experimenting with more sophisticated modelling 
approaches, such as dynamic replicating portfolio models 
and net present value Monte Carlo simulation models. 
This section brieﬂ   y discusses the general idea behind 
the different modelling approaches.  (2) Some supervi-
sory concerns about these techniques are identiﬁ  ed  in 
Section 2.3.
STATIC REPLICATING PORTFOLIO MODELS
The idea is to calculate the return from investing the avail-
able volume of deposits in a portfolio of ﬁ  xed-income 
assets with various maturities such that a speciﬁ  c objective 
criterion is optimised and subject to the constraint that 
the portfolio exactly replicates the dynamics of outstand-
ing deposit balances over some historic sample period. For 
example, a possible criterion could be to select the port-
folio of assets that yields the most stable margin over the 
deposit rate over the sample period, i.e. the portfolio that 
minimises the standard deviation of the margin, while 
replicating the deposit balance dynamics. Alternatively, 
another criterion may aim to maximise the risk-adjusted 
margin, measured by the margin’s Sharpe ratio, i.e. the 
ratio of the average margin to the standard deviation of 
the margin, while replicating the deposit balance dynam-
ics. The duration of saving deposits is then estimated 
as the duration of the replicating portfolio, combining 
ﬁ  xed-income assets of various maturities, that optimizes 
the criterion.  (3)
A concrete application of the replicating portfolio model 
to a Belgian bank is illustrated in Box 2.
(1)  The above results need to be interpreted with care, given that many caveats 
apply : (i) the exercise is done on unconsolidated ﬁ  gures only, (ii) options and 
other nonlinear products are treated in a relatively rudimentary way at their delta 
value and, for example, do not reﬂ  ect caps and ﬂ  oors, (iii) exposures of opposite 
sign in different currencies are assumed to offset and each other.
(2)  There are few descriptions of the replicating portfolio approach in the public 
domain. The description below is based on Wilson (1994), as well as on 
discussions we had with several ALM practitioners and CBFA analysts (see also 
Box 2). Ellis and Jordan (2001) and OTS (2001) are good introductory reviews 
of the Monte Carlo net present value approach. We will not discuss the very 
different statistical individual account approach, where the idea is to track and 
store data on individual deposit accounts for several years and to measure their 
sensitivity to changes in deposit and market rates. Anderson and McCarthy 
(1986) describe such a statistical approach and report deposit premiums between 
6 and 8 p.c. The results of Sheehan (2004) also indicate that deposits have 
substantial value to ﬁ  nancial institutions. He ﬁ  nds that the value of core deposits 
varies substantially by institution, depending on the institution’s supply of deposits 
and ability to retain deposits.
(3)  An additional important decision variable can be inferred from these simple 
models, since the estimated optimal portfolio return can be interpreted as 
the correct transfer price of the deposited funds. Indeed, the transfer price of 
savings deposits can be deﬁ  ned as the return that the bank could have gained 
if it had invested the deposited funds in the replicating portfolio, since the latter 
minimizes the interest margin risk and reﬂ  ects the withdrawal risk. All business 
lines subsequently may be required to use the transfer price as their hurdle rate, 
i.e. their benchmark cost of funds. In universal banks or ﬁ  nancial conglomerates, 
the determination of a fair transfer price for funds allocated to the different 
business lines is an important issue.146
Box 2  –  Replicating portfolio models : application to a Belgian bank
The replicating portfolio approach basically boils down to an optimisation problem  : we need to pick a vector of 
portfolio weights of assets such that the value of the objective function is optimised and subject to the restrictions 
that, at all instances, the volume of the replicating portfolio should match that of the replicated deposits. All 
weights need to sum up to unity and short selling is often not allowed. Given that only liquid, standard assets are 
held to maturity, the investment strategy will only require small trading costs, which are subsequently neglected 
in the empirical analysis.
Typically, the replicated deposits are only a portion of total deposits, since banks, in practice, classify total deposits 
into interest-rate insensitive core deposits, volatile deposits, and remaining balances. Only the latter will get 
replicated, whereas core deposits are assumed to be invested at a discretionary long horizon and volatile deposits 
at the interest rate risk free short horizon.
For the optimisation criterion of minimising the standard deviation of the margin, i.e. the spread between the 
portfolio return and the deposit rate, the problem can be stated as follows :
Min   std (rp–R)
subject to the constraints that (i) ∑ wi ri = rp
n
, where ∑ wi  = 1
n
, (ii) no short sales are allowed, i.e. wi ≥ 0, ∀i, and (iii) the 
volume of deposits is perfectly replicated by the portfolio investment at all sample dates. In the above, rp denotes 
the return of the replicating portfolio, R the deposit rate, and {w1 , ... ,wn } the vector of weights corresponding to 
the set of n available standard assets, each with return ri . Since market rates are higher than deposit rates on 
average (recall Chart 3), the resulting replicating portfolio return will typically exceed the deposit rate, and average 
margins will be positive. Investments are held to maturity and need to be rolled-over when they mature.
We estimate such a model on data for a large Belgian bank for the period June 1996-November 2004, where 
Bibor/Euribor and zero coupon bond yields are used as market rates and implicit deposit rates. The baseline 
speciﬁ  cation of our model assumes (i) a 100 month window size (total length of our sample), (ii) six assets with 
3m, 6m, 12m, 3yr, 5yr and 10yr maturities, (iii) minimisation of the standard deviation of the margin as objective 
TABLE 1 IMPACT OF CHANGES IN REPLICATING PORTFOLIO MODEL PARAMETERS AND STRESS EVENTS ON THE DURATION 
ESTIMATE OF REGULATED SAVINGS DEPOSITS
Source: NBB.
Model specifications
0 = baseline 1 2 3
Optimisation criterion  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Std. dev. Sharpe ratio Std. dev. Std. dev.
Core deposits (p.c.)   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 25 10 10
Volatile deposits (p.c.)   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 10 25 25
Stress event   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . no no no yes
Average margin (p.c.)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.21 3.41 3.21 1.76
Standard deviation margin (p.c.) . . . . . . . . 0.11 0.15 0.11 0.31
Duration (years)   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.0 4.3 4.0 1.9
Total duration (years)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.5 3.7 2.9 1.6
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function, and (iv) 25 p.c. core deposit balances, invested at a 7 year horizon, and 10 p.c. volatile balances, invested 
at a monthly horizon. The remaining 65 p.c. of original balances is replicated by the model.
Besides the baseline speciﬁ  cation, we will also analyse the sensitivity of duration estimates to alternative model 
speciﬁ  cations, in particular the impact of (i) an alternative objective criterion, (ii) alternative assumptions about 
proportions of core and volatile deposits, and (iii) stress circumstances  (1). More speciﬁ  cally, in speciﬁ  cation 1 we 
repeat the optimisation in the baseline case, except for the optimisation criterion, which is now to maximise the 
Sharpe ratio of the margin. Indeed, a bank may want to accept a slightly higher standard deviation of the margin, 
if it can increase the average margin substantially by doing so. Speciﬁ  cation 2 lowers the proportion of core 
deposits from 25 p.c. to 10 p.c. and increases the proportion of volatile deposits from 10 p.c. to 25 p.c., compared 
to baseline. Speciﬁ  cation 3 introduces a stress scenario by adding six monthly observation points to the available 
sample of deposit rates, savings deposit balances, and market rates, after which the estimation is conducted over 
the 106 available time points. The stylized stress circumstances imply that (i) all market rates increase with 0.5  p.c. 
every month for the next 6 months, (ii) savings deposit rates increase by 0.33 p.c. every month, (iii) balances are 
assumed to remain constant, and (iv) core deposits drop to 10 p.c. and volatile deposits increase to 25 p.c. of 
total deposits.
The last two rows of Table 1 report the duration estimates that result from our optimisation exercise. We distinguish 
between the duration estimate that follows from our replicating portfolio application to non-volatile, non-core 
deposits and the total duration estimate that also incorporates the effect of the assumptions about volatile and 
core deposits. The baseline model speciﬁ  cation results in a total duration estimate of 3.5 years. As expected, we 
can see that the Sharpe ratio criterion in speciﬁ  cation 1 implies a slightly higher margin standard deviation, but 
at the beneﬁ  t of a substantially higher average margin. The total duration is estimated to increase only slightly. 
Speciﬁ  cation 2 reveals the sensitivity of the total duration estimate to the assumptions made with regard to core 
and volatile deposits. The total duration may decrease by more than 6 months if core deposits are shifted to 
volatile deposits. Finally, the stress circumstances in speciﬁ  cation 3 lead to a substantial deterioration of both the 
average margin and the standard deviation of the margin, compared to the baseline case. Most importantly, the 
total duration falls to 1.6 years.
In Chart 1 we plot the full sample (i.e. 100 month) total duration estimate against increasingly smaller window 
size duration estimates (up to the 60 month window) for both the standard deviation and Sharpe ratio criterions. 
The chart reveals that the choice of the estimation window may not be innocuous, since the duration estimate 
varies between 1.8 and 4.2 years in the standard deviation optimisation, depending on how far back in time one is 
willing to go. We also observe that the standard deviation and Sharpe ratio criterions need not always give similar 
results. The former may lead to substantially lower estimates in our case. This is intuitive, since, in periods where 
interest rate volatility becomes relatively more important, the standard deviation criterion duration will immediately 
reﬂ  ect this, while the Sharpe ratio criterion will trade off the increased volatility against a smaller margin.
(1)  We have also analysed the robustness of duration estimates with respect to the inclusion and exclusion of zero coupon bonds and the use of advertised instead of 
implicit deposit rates, but found that duration estimates were reasonably close to our baseline estimates along these dimensions.
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DYNAMIC REPLICATING PORTFOLIO MODELS
Whereas, in the static replicating portfolio models, matur-
ing funds are always renewed at the same maturity and 
the replicating portfolio vector is assumed to be constant, 
dynamic replicating portfolio models allow the bank to 
react more quickly by adapting the portfolio to changes 
in client behaviour and the market environment.  (1) In 
particular, the models are able to incorporate uncertainty 
in interest rate and balance dynamics by generating sce-
narios of their possible future outcomes, whereas care 
is taken to capture the observed correlations between 
interest rates and volumes. Since the scenarios are based 
on current market circumstances, the resulting replicating 
portfolios are adjusted dynamically over time to the cur-
rent situation.
NET PRESENT VALUE MONTE CARLO SIMULATION MODELS
The net present value Monte Carlo simulation models are 
related to the dynamic replicating portfolio models, in the 
sense that they also try to capture the impact of uncer-
tainty about rates and balances and their interaction. 
However, they differ through a focus on the valuation of 
deposit accounts, deﬁ  ning the value of the deposit liability 
as the discounted future cash ﬂ  ows that correspond to 
servicing outstanding balances. The idea can be summa-
rized in ﬁ  ve steps :
1. The dynamics of deposit rates and deposit balances 
are estimated as a function of market rates, lagged 
variables, and other, potentially relevant variables.
2. A large number of market rate paths, say 1000, are 
then simulated for the next, say, 30 years, from which 
1000 simulated deposit rate and balances paths are 
then derived. The time t economic rent  (2) is deﬁ  ned 
as outstanding balances at time t times the difference 
between market rates and the cost to the bank of 
issuing the deposits, i.e. the sum of the deposit rate 
that is paid plus the servicing cost as a percentage of 
outstanding balances at t. Hence, the dynamics of eco-
nomic rents depends on the dynamics of the spread 
between market and deposit rates, deposit balances, 
and servicing costs.
(1)  See Frauendorfer and Schürle (2003) and Zenios and Ziemba (1992) for examples 
of multistage stochastic programming models.
(2)  The banking literature suggests that economic rents exist (Selvaggio (1996), 
O’Brien (2000), Anderson and McCarthy (1986), etc.). Potential sources 
of economic rents include : regulatory barriers to entry leading to market 
concentration (Jarrow and van Deventer (1998), Hannan and Berger (1991)) ; 
clients accepting low deposit rates because they beneﬁ  t from other services, 
for example more advantageous mortgage ﬁ  nancing (Jarrow and van Deventer 
(1998)) ; costs to consumers of switching banks (Ausubel (1992), Sharpe (1997)) ; 
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3.  The value of the saving deposit account, often referred 
to as the deposit liability value, is then deﬁ  ned and 
computed as the net present value of all future econo-
mic rents, averaged over all simulation paths. The diffe-
rence between current nominal outstanding balances 
in euro and the deposit liability value is deﬁ  ned as the 
deposit premium.
4.  Steps two and three are repeated, but now based on 
the simulated market rate paths shocked by, typically, 
100 basis points. As a result, we get different numbers 
for deposit liability value and deposit premium.
5. In line with the traditional deﬁ  nition, the duration of 
the saving deposit account is then set equal to the 
change in the deposit liability value divided by the 
change in the market interest rate  (1).
There are two related modelling approaches to calculate 
the net present value of future economic rents, and both 
are common in option pricing and term structure mod-
elling  (2) The ﬁ   rst is the Option Adjusted Spread (OAS) 
approach, where the idea is to discount expected future 
cash ﬂ  ows with a discount rate that reﬂ  ects the riskiness 
of the cash ﬂ  ows. The discount rate includes an extra risk 
premium, the OAS, to account for the embedded option 
riskiness of the cash ﬂ  ows. The second approach is the 
contingent claim or no-arbitrage approach. Here, the idea 
is to manipulate the true cash ﬂ  ows so that the manipu-
lated cash ﬂ  ows can be discounted at the risk free rate. 
The manipulation of the cash ﬂ  ows is done by subtracting 
a risk premium that reﬂ  ects the embedded option risk, 
resulting in certainty-equivalent cash ﬂ  ows.
2.3   Prudential concerns and assessment
The replicating portfolio and net present value Monte 
Carlo simulation models each raise a number of statistical 
and conceptual concerns. Because the concerns are not 
easy to address, supervisors may have been discouraged 
from relying on any single speciﬁ  c modelling approach to 
estimate duration of savings deposits. The concerns can 
be grouped into two broad categories  : speciﬁ  cation of 
behavioural relationships and sensitivity to discretionary 
model assumptions.
A reliable and robust measurement of the relationship 
between deposit balances and deposit rate dynamics is 
very difﬁ  cult to obtain, since the relationship may in fact 
change from bank to bank and even, within the same 
bank, over time. For example, new ﬁ  nancial products can 
make more attractive alternatives available to depositors, 
which will increase their sensitivity to the opportunity 
cost.
Moreover, the use of backward looking approaches to 
tackle this issue, i.e. looking at the last x years of data 
to estimate behavioural relationships, may not reveal rel-
evant information when the future is likely to be very dif-
ferent from the past. A related problem is that the use of a 
longer time series, which is in principle advisable for more 
reliable statistical inference, may increase the risk of failing 
to detect changes in market or behavioural structure.
The static replicating portfolio models suffer particularly 
from these drawbacks, whereas the net present value 
Monte Carlo simulation and dynamic replicating portfo-
lio models are more forward-looking through simulating 
and averaging over a range of possible future scenarios. 
However, the latter still remain sensitive to the speciﬁ  ca-
tion of behavioural relationships.
Besides the above problems relating to the speciﬁ  cation of 
behavioural relationships, the model results are also quite 
sensitive to discretionary model parameter choices. For 
example, replicating portfolio models require assumptions 
about the optimisation criterion, the proportion of “core” 
and “volatile” deposits, and the relevant window size for 
estimation, while net present value Monte Carlo models 
also require a selection of explanatory variables that enter 
the behavioural relationships and assumptions about the 
size of the servicing cost parameter.
The application of the replicating portfolio model to a 
large Belgian bank in Box 2 illustrates that the impact 
of alternative assumptions about model parameters may 
not be innocuous in terms of the estimated duration of 
savings deposits. While replicating portfolio (and alterna-
tive models) may be useful as risk management tools, the 
relatively large range of duration estimates that can be 
derived from these models may make supervisors reluc-
tant to use a single model to make inferences about the 
interest rate risk of savings deposits. From the supervi-
sory viewpoint, the value added of a consistent model-
ling approach across banks lies in the fact that uniform 
parameter assumptions are applied across different banks, 
which should enhance the comparability of the estimates 
between institutions and through time.
(1)  O’Brien (2000) reports typical mean retail deposit premia between 10 and 20 p.c. 
of outstanding deposits, i.e. the deposit liability value lies 10 to 20 p.c. below its 
nominal value (hence issuing deposit accounts typically increases the market value 
of equity of banks).
(2)  Examples of the former are Selvaggio (1996) and Ofﬁ  ce of Thrift Supervision 
(2001), examples of the latter are Hutchison and Pennacchi (1996), Jarrow 
and van Deventer (1998), O’Brien (2000), Janosi, Jarrow and Zullo (1999), and 
Kalkbrener and Willing (2004).150
In general, a problem with the observed range of banks’ 
reported duration estimates is that it is unclear whether 
those variations are due to different bank behaviour, 
client behaviour, modelling approach, parameter assump-
tions, general interest rate market environment, or a 
combination of all these factors. Moreover, it is unclear 
to what extent the duration estimated in normal times 
reﬂ  ects    savings deposits’ characteristics in stressful cir-
cumstances.
Conclusions
The favourable tax treatment and the liquidity services 
that regulated savings deposits provide to the deposit 
holder, as well as the stable source of ﬁ  nance they rep-
resent for banks, account for the popularity of saving 
deposits in Belgium.
Given their importance, savings deposits potentially 
have major ﬁ  nancial stability implications for the Belgian 
ﬁ  nancial system. Compared to deﬁ  ned maturity accounts 
and traditional ﬁ  xed-income products, regulated savings 
deposits are challenging to analyse from a prudential and 
risk management perspective. Those complexities arise 
from the presence of two embedded options, the with-
drawal option and the deposit rate setting option, which 
are clearly not independent of each other. The exercise of 
one of those options will certainly inﬂ  uence the timing of 
the exercise of the other.
In this article, we identiﬁ  ed stylised facts regarding the 
dynamics of Belgian saving deposit balances and rates 
and discussed the models that are being proposed and 
used by banks to account for their interest rate risk. We 
discussed potential model weaknesses, which are in fact 
not speciﬁ   c to the Belgian context, from a prudential 
point of view. We ﬁ  nd that simple static replicating port-
folio models may fail to reﬂ  ect the impact of stress events 
and are particularly vulnerable to model risk. Net present 
value Monte Carlo and dynamic replicating portfolio 
models seem conceptually stronger and are able to cap-
ture uncertainty about future events, but still rely heavily 
on discretionary model assumptions and the stability of 
the behavioural relations. Hence, they may also yield a 
relatively large range of duration estimates.
In the end, interest rate risk management of nonmatu-
rity accounts remains an art as well as a science, being 
inherently exposed to model risk. Therefore, it is perhaps 
understandable that the IASB is reluctant to enter the 
debate of fair valuation of nonmaturity accounts at any-
thing below the nominal value, and that bank regulators 
want to make conservative assumptions regarding the 
duration of savings deposits in their off-site identiﬁ  cation 
of interest rate risk outliers.151
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